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This article examined several crucial themes in Adam Smith’s philosophy with the purpose 
of highlighting and assessing his contribution to the secularisation of Western society. 
The article, written from the perspective of reformational philosophy, begins with a brief 
biography and sketch of Adam Smith’s influence on modern society, followed by a summary 
of Ponti Venter’s view on Smith. This sets the scene for a discussion of Adam Smith’s project, 
his method of tackling it, and his views on systems, philosophy of history and the concept of 
philosophy.
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Adam Smith se bydrae tot sekularisering. Hierdie artikel het verskeie beslissende temas in 
Adam Smith se filosofie ondersoek met die doel om sy bydrae tot die sekularisering van die 
Westerse samelewing uit te lig en te assesseer. Die artikel, wat vanuit die perspektief van die 
Reformatoriese filosofie geskryf is, begin met ’n kort biografie en skets van Adam Smith se 
invloed op die moderne samelewing, gevolg deur ’n opsomming van Ponti Venter se siening 
van Smith. Dit skep die toneel vir ’n bespreking van Adam Smith se projek, sy metode, asook 
sy siening oor sisteme, die filosofie van geskiedenis en die konsep van filosofie. 
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Introduction
Ponti Venter, to whom this article is dedicated, has studied intensely the philosophies of 
the Enlightenment period. In his view, the recent world cannot be understood without 
acknowledging the influence of the Enlightenment. His analyses of Smith’s philosophy 
emphasise his mechanistic world picture as well as the tensions between nature and culture and 
the individual and society during the Enlightenment period. 
 
As there is no intrinsic reflection in Smith on divine law or divinely given norms to which the 
creation is subject, he has contributed to the secularisation of Western culture since the 18th 
century, especially through his influence on the development of liberal political economy. 
Some recent studies on Smith’s methodology and history of philosophy point in the direction 
of Smith’s philosophic conception as akin to ennoetism (in-the-mind-ism), a type identified in 
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven’s system of the history of philosophy. This type is shared by a number of 
Enlightenment thinkers, who, like Smith, were influenced by Isaac Newton (1642–1724), who 
was also an ennoetist. It involves a contemplating, thinking spirit and a psychosomatic reality 
that moves by itself, mechanically, and which is, therefore, conducive to laissez-faire economics. 
This concept has made it possible for Smith to be a technicistic philosopher, in the sense that 
new technologies propel by themselves the accumulation of capital and the division of labour. 
Hans Sachsse’s definition of technicism as a belief that all of life’s problems may be solved by a 
scientific-technical transformation of the world (Sachsse 1978:180) is applicable to Adam Smith, 
who called it progress or improvement. Technicism has become a major road to a materialistic 
secularised society.
The article is written from the perspective of reformational philosophy and begins with a brief 
biography and sketch of Adam Smith’s influence on modern society, followed by a summary 
of Ponti Venter’s view on him. This sets the scene for a discussion of Adam Smith’s project, his 
method of tackling it, and his views on systems, the philosophy of history and the concept of 
philosophy. 
Brief biography
Adam Smith was born in 1723 and studied moral philosophy in Glasgow under Hutcheson, 
after which he went to Oxford University. From 1748 to 1751 he lectured on ‘rhetoric and belles 
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lettres’ in Edinburgh. In 1751 he was elected Chair of Logic 
at the University of Glasgow, but was translated in 1752 to 
the Chair of Moral Philosophy. A large part of his lectures 
on moral philosophy were published in 1759 as ‘The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments’. He resigned from this professorship 
in 1763. In 1764 he visited France, with the son of the Duke 
of Buccleuch, where he met the leading French philosophers 
and economists. After his return to the United Kingdom in 
1766 he completed ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations’, which was first published in 1776. 
He prepared not only four subsequent editions, but also 
five new editions of ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’. In 
1778 he became Commissioner of Customs in Scotland. He 
moved in the circles of prominent merchants, politicians 
and academics. He died in 1790. In 1795 a set of papers 
were published posthumously under the title ‘Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects’ covering topics such as histories 
of astronomy, ancient physics and ancient logics and 
metaphysics, the external senses, the imitative arts and the 
affinity between music, dancing and poetry. 
Adam Smith’s influence 
Robert Heilbroner (1955) outlined how revolutionary 
the general operation of markets governed by the ‘price 
mechanism’ was at the time when Smith’s ‘The Wealth of 
Nations’ was published. Previously, traditional and/or 
authoritarian rulers were instrumental in providing people 
with their daily sustenance. The introduction of an ‘economy’ 
as a set of markets, in which people and firms are only 
motivated by their self-interest, was a great novelty. ‘Land, 
labour and capital as foundations of the economic system 
or as impersonal, de-humanised economic entities were 
modern inventions, as modern as the calculus’ (Heilbroner 
1955:20, author’s own translation). Expounding Smith’s 
system Heilbroner emphasises the power of the division of 
labour which, together with the price mechanism, would 
propel an accumulation of capital as a means of growing 
material welfare. 
Similarly, Karl Polanyi (1983) referred to the great 
transformation that took place in Western societies during 
the 19th century, as the economy became dominated by 
markets. Previously, land, labour and money (capital) were 
not part of a self-regulating system of markets and prices. In 
his view there has rarely been a statement that anticipated 
the future so much as Adam Smith’s dictum that the division 
of labour depends on the human propensity to barter, truck 
and exchange one thing for another (Polanyi ibid:71, 72).
Influential thinkers of the 20th century, such as F.A. 
Hayek, Milton Friedman, Walter Lippman and many other 
contributors to neo-liberalism – a system of thought that 
views the whole of society, ideally, as a set of markets, free 
from Government intervention and with individuals striving 
to maximise their self-interest – have echoed Adam Smith’s 
views on the power of the price mechanism. Invariably, they 
emphasise, like Smith, the inefficiencies of the state and the 
productiveness of the private sector. 
Current economic theory of firms, consumers, welfare, 
international trade, capital, and growth shows how 
equilibrium (balance) is achieved through ‘the price 
mechanism’ by individuals and business firms maximising 
their utility and profits. Behavioural economics (rational 
choice theory) extends this thinking to just about everything 
under the sun. 
Although self-interest and its maximisation had already 
become part of the Western discourse before Adam Smith 
(Laval 2007), his popularity has reinforced and spread its 
influence. Kouwenhoven (1965:42) notes that for Smith’s 
contemporaries the ‘The Wealth of Nations’ rated as second 
only to the Bible. Since, as Laval (2007) points out, self-interest 
has become ‘a pure and simple substitute for the Christian 
religion’ (p. 18), Adam Smith has made a major contribution 
to secularisation, understood as the de-christianising of 
Western culture. 
Ponti Venter’s assessment of Adam 
Smith’s philosophy
Similar to Laval, Ponti Venter sees the Enlightenment as a new 
view of life which eliminated the last remnants of Christian 
doctrine from the synthesis of Christian and Classical ideas of 
the Middle Ages (Venter 1992:321). Indeed, he understands 
our modern Western society as one that is directed by ‘the 
Divinity of Material Welfare’ (Venter 2002:289). 
Venter’s assessment is that, as an Enlightenment thinker, 
Adam Smith believed that social progress would be brought 
about through economic growth, provided people are free, 
and not hindered by Government, to promote their self-
interest by saving and working hard under the critical eye 
of the impartial spectator (an ideal human being led by 
reason). Self-interest is consistent with competition between 
individuals and would enable society to advance towards 
progress (dialectic between individual and society). Smith 
follows Hobbes and Rousseau’s contractual view of society, 
albeit economistically interpreted (man is by nature a 
hawker). By separating God’s final causality (the teleology of 
nature) from human efficient causality Smith could develop 
theories of morality and economics in a mechanistic way, 
despite his acceptance of a cosmic harmony à la Leibniz. 
Smith was led to this mechanistic approach through his 
interest in Isaac Newton. 
Thus, competition is necessary to prevent the machine of 
society from stagnating. At the same time one can find in 
Smith a longing for a simple life in unspoilt nature, with 
a preference for farming, indicating a dialectic between 
origin and progress or between nature and culture (Venter 
1992:324–330).
Recent studies by Biziou (2003), Marouby (2004), Buchan 
(2006), Phillipson (2011) and an earlier one by Van Leeuwen 
(1984), not only confirm Venter’s analysis, but also extend it.
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Smith’s project
Phillipson (2011) describes Smith’s project as nothing less 
than:
to develop a genuine Science of Man based upon the observation 
of human nature and human history and which would explain 
the principles of government and legislation that ought to be 
followed by enlightened rulers who wanted to extend the liberty 
and happiness of their subjects and the wealth and power of 
their dominions. (p. 2) 
Smith tackled much of this project in his lectures on moral 
philosophy, which were divided into four areas, namely:
1. Natural theology (proofs of the being and attributes of 
God and the principles upon which religion is founded). 
2. Natural ethics (the basis of ‘The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments’ [1759]).
3. Morality as codified into justice to trace according to 
Buchan (2006:42): the gradual progress of jurisprudence, 
both public and private, from the rudest to the most 
refined ages, and to point out the effects of those arts 
which contribute to subsistence, and the accumulation of 
property, in producing correspondent improvements or 
alterations in law and government. 
4. The political institutions relating to commerce, finance, 
and the ecclesiastical and military establishments. 
The last two formed the basis of ‘The Wealth of Nations’ 
(1776). Student notes on the lectures of part 3 have been 
published as ‘Lectures on Jurisprudence’ (Smith 1766). 
Student notes on the course given in Edinburgh on Rhetoric 
and Belles letters in 1748–1751, including an essay on the 
origin and significance of language, have also become 
available. 
The lectures on jurisprudence include much of the material of 
Smith (1776), meaning that his views on political economy 
should be seen as part and parcel of his moral philosophy. 
Van Leeuwen (1984:33, 34) puts the four-part curriculum 
in the context of Thomas of Aquinas’s distinction between 
the ‘philosophicae disciplinae’ [study of philosophy], which 
were guided by natural reason, and the ‘sacra doctrina’ 
[sacred doctrine], which were part of supra-natural theology 
and guided by the light of Revelation. Natural theology 
resorted under the ‘philosophicae disciplinae’ [philosophical 
discipline]. Despite not publishing on natural theology 
Smith would have lectured on proofs of God’s existence and 
a moral world government. As a deist, he believed that the 
existence of God and a moral system of world government 
are universal truths which are acknowledged by human 
reason. This elimination of Revelation and a reduction of all 
theology to rational insight have become ‘an essential aspect 
of the total secularisation process’, meaning that ‘the natural 
has assumed the fundamental position of Revelation’ (Van 
Leeuwen 1984:35). 
The wide scope of Smith’s project and publications suggests, 
according to Biziou (2003), that he aimed at becoming a 
‘Newton of the human world as a whole’ (pp. 103–104). 
As Newton had managed to unify the theory of astronomy 
on the basis of the principle of gravity, so Smith sought to 
show the basic principles that unify the human spheres of 
ethics, jurisprudence, political economy and others. Not 
surprisingly, Smith was unable to finish this grand project. 
Many parts he had drafted were burnt at his request, with 
the exception of the essays on philosophical subjects. Of 
these, the history of astronomy holds pride of place, as its 
methodological introduction provides clues to his general 
approach. 
Smith’s method 
Smith’s method consisted of a Newtonian analysis involving 
‘certain principles known or proved in the beginning, from 
whence we account for the several Phenomena, connecting 
all together by the same Chain’, so that people would get a 
map of the world of experience (Phillipson 2011:100). 
Smith (1795) focuses in particular upon three psychological 
sentiments, namely:
wonder, surprise, and admiration, are words which, though 
often confounded, denote, in our language, sentiments that are 
indeed allied, but that are in some respects different also, and 
distinct from one another. What is new and singular, excites 
that sentiment which, in strict propriety, is called Wonder; 
what is unexpected, Surprise; and what is great or beautiful, 
Admiration. (p. 33)
According to Smith (1795:50) humankind would have been 
baffled in its early stages by strange phenomena, such 
as an eclipse of the sun. They alleviated their concerns by 
fantasising that Jupiter’s invisible hand was the cause, maybe 
because he was displeased with them. Hence, cults were 
designed to keep the deities happy. This age of superstition 
was superseded when sufficient spare subsistence allowed 
some people time for science (Smith ibid). 
Systematic reflection, which involves the imagination, now 
had to find another way of alleviating the sentiment of 
wonder when it was disturbed by intervals or gaps in the 
normal orderly chain of events. Rather than imagining that 
gods are the cause of phenomena, philosophers looked for 
machines that calm the imagination and dispense with the 
need of finding final causes. They are blind mechanisms 
which obey general laws. According to Smith (1795) we may 
also think of systems, instead of machines, because:
systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a 
little system, created to perform, as well as to connect together, 
in reality, those different movements and effects which the artist 
has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented 
to connect together in the fancy those different movements and 
effects which are already in reality performed. (p. 66)  
The imagination needs analogies to perceive the systems 
that make sense of phenomena, by using something familiar 
from another field. As Smith (1795) puts it:
In the same manner also, others have written parallels of painting 
and poetry, of poetry and music, of music and architecture, 
of beauty and virtue, of all the fine arts; systems which have 
universally owed their origin to the elucubrations1 of those who 
were acquainted with the one art, but ignorant of the other; 
1.The original has ‘lucubrations’.
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who therefore explained to themselves the phaenomena, in that 
which was strange to them, by those in that which was familiar; 
and with whom, upon that account, the analogy, which in other 
writers gives occasion to a few ingenious similitudes, became the 
great hinge upon which every thing turned. (p. 47)
As the imagination confronts phenomena and seeks to 
connect them, it needs bridges or analogies between what is 
already known and that which is still unknown. In this way 
it seeks to make the universe coherent in a system of thought. 
Systems, in their perfection, are aesthetically pleasing and, 
therefore, excite the sentiment of admiration (Smith 1795:46). 
Smith believes that something is only understood properly if it 
meets three criteria, namely: 
•	 familiarity (1795:46, 47)
•	 completeness (1795:50)
•	 simplicity (1795:66).
Applying these criteria to Newton’s system, Smith (1795) 
notes that ‘gravity is most familiar to us’ and that Newton’s 
principles ‘connect together most perfectly all the phaenomena 
of the Heavens’ (completeness). Simplicity is entailed by the 
‘universality of gravity, and that it decreases as the squares of 
the distance increase, and all the appearances ... necessarily 
follow’ (pp. 104–105). The simplicity and perfection of 
Newton’s system is aesthetically pleasing. Biziou (2003) 
notes: ‘it expresses a fundamental requirement of the spirit in 
its attempt to understand the universe’ (p. 86). 
Science is not so much about gathering data but rather about 
connecting them by means of principles. Systems should 
provide coherence to a field of study. They are always open 
to revision when the sentiments of surprise and wonder are 
excited again by new discoveries or facts. Such revisions 
should restore coherence. 
Once a field of study has been satisfactorily systematised, 
another field may call for attention. Thus, the study of 
astronomy was followed by that of ancient physics, which 
included fossils, minerals, plants, and animals (Smith 
1795:106). 
In terms of what he saw as his own task, namely systematising 
human society, Smith specified neither his grand 
comprehensive system of all the disciplines nor the unique 
principle that would tie them all together. In Biziou’s view, 
however, he used the principle of analogy as a key, because 
it lies behind the concepts of sympathy (moral sentiments), 
exchange (economics), and imitation (aesthetics) (Biziou 
2003:107, footnote 2). 
Self-regulating systems
When a system is overcomplete, it lacks simplicity and 
familiarity, necessitating a revision. When it satisfies the 
requirement of simplicity, it may not be able to account for 
all of the phenomena. Hence, the three requirements tend to 
keep each other in balance. A good system is self-regulating. 
Smith’s works on moral sentiments and political economy 
had self-regulating systems at their core.
The system of moral sentiments
In the theory of moral sentiments ‘sympathy denotes our 
fellow-feeling with any passion whatever’ (Smith 1759:10). 
Sympathy helps us to see ourselves in the imagination as 
others see us. It works like a mirror. Since sympathy with 
others might be excessive, so that it impairs our effectiveness, 
it is regulated by an impartial spectator, who is a potential, 
ideal and, therefore abstract rational human (Smith 
1759:83ff). This rational human moderates the intensity of 
our passions and sentiments to a level that makes it possible 
to live in society. The medial degree of virtue (convenance) 
should allow society to function well. By deviating from the 
middle road problems arise. Should, for instance, people 
pursue the interests of others by completely disregarding 
their own, society would become dysfunctional. Similarly, 
if they wanted vengeance at all costs or were exclusively 
bent on satisfying their own interests, society would break 
down. Nonetheless, crimes should be punished, lest society 
falls apart. Put positively, justice is called for as a basis for 
economic exchange. A moral society should be fair because 
all people are equal. Smith (1795) stated if somebody:
in the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, … should 
jostle, or throw down any (of his competitors), the indulgence 
of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair 
play, which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every 
respect, as good as they are. (p. 83) 
The rational moderator of sympathy built into each person is, 
therefore, essential to maintain society (Biziou 2003:130–131).
The system of exchange
Smith’s system of political economy takes its starting point 
in ‘a certain propensity in human nature … to truck, barter, 
and exchange one thing for another’ (Smith 1776:22). It is this 
propensity which gives rise to the division of labour and its 
advantages.
 
Smith bases his anthropology, along with Turgot and 
Rousseau, on a four-stage history (Marouby 2004:25) based 
upon mode of subsistence, namely:
•	 hunting and fishing
•	 shepherding
•	 agriculture
•	 manufacturing/commerce.
In the commercial society the benefits of the division of labour 
would be fully enjoyed. In such a society production comes 
about in a tripartite fashion, namely land, remunerated as 
rent, capital yielding profits and labour earning wages. 
Smith (1776:III) invokes the history of Europe since the 
collapse of the Roman Empire to show that ‘in the natural 
course of things’ agriculture is developed first, and when it 
produces surplus subsistence, cities may be founded. Towns 
themselves furnish only the means of ‘conveniency and 
luxury’ (Smith ibid:482). Only when neither country nor town 
needs more capital, will investment in foreign commerce 
take place. The point is that in Europe’s history this natural 
progression has been inverted. Feudalism devised rules 
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such as primogeniture and lineal succession and in this 
way deprived thousands from a living on the land. Great 
landlords were not interested in improving their estates. The 
power of feudal lords had to give way to that of kings and 
a growing number of city-based manufacturers, merchants 
and bankers, who invested in agriculture. As states were 
organised, the mercantile system arose with countless rules 
to promote exports and hinder imports (Smith ibid:IV). In 
each of these cases the actual developments were suboptimal, 
because they were contrary to the natural course of things, 
favouring manufacturers rather than society as a whole. 
Similarly, the physiocratic system is denounced because its 
focus on agriculture as the only source of wealth runs against 
securing the benefits of the division of labour (Smith ibid:860–
861). Hence, Smith (ibid:V) sets out what Government policy 
should be to maintain the natural course of things. 
Under ‘perfect liberty’, competition ensures that actual prices 
of all ‘commodities continually gravitate to the central price’ 
(Smith 1776:84). Monopolies of all kinds retard progress. 
Clearly, competition is the regulator in the system of 
exchange, and ensures optimal benefits under perfect liberty 
(Biziou 2003:205–207). 
The relationship between the moral and the commercial 
society
The moral and the commercial society have a great deal 
in common, inasmuch as sympathy plays a role in the 
commercial society and exchange in the moral one. In 
the former sympathy enables us to know what others 
want, whilst in the latter people could simply get on ‘by a 
mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed 
valuation’. (Smith 1759:86). When confronted with crimes, 
whether against property or life, people want justice to be 
done. The individuals of a society are all equal in this regard. 
Smith (1759) states that:
We are no more concerned for the destruction or loss of a single 
man, … than we are concerned for the loss of a single guinea, 
because this guinea is a part of a thousand guineas, and because 
we should be concerned for the loss of the whole sum. (p. 89) 
Van Leeuwen (1984) sums this up as: everyone is everybody. 
Society consists of individuals who are as much distinct as 
coins of the same denomination (p. 97). Although the self-
regulating systems of moral sentiments and that of economic 
exchange differ, they involve the same people, albeit seen 
from different perspectives. The two regulating systems may 
interact. Economic exchange relationships work best not only 
under competition but also when sympathy moderates the 
desire for what others have to a point of convenance where 
people are not tempted to steal or to borrow excessively. 
Nevertheless, in Smith’s theory the two societies somehow 
remain distinct. 
Modern neoliberalism, however, seeks to extend the rule 
of markets and competition to the whole of society (Dardot 
& Laval 2009:403–456), so that the commercial society 
completely overwhelms the moral one. This is a key element 
of current secularisation as it extends self-interest and 
competition to every area of life.
Smith’s philosophy of history
Smith’s four-stage history is a conjectural history, resting 
upon the following universal behavioural assumptions:
1. People are confronted with a scarcity of resources, 
especially during the first stage of hunting. (Smith 1776:2)
2. They want to better themselves, especially in a material 
sense. (Smith 1776:2)
3. They want to barter and exchange. (Smith 1776:22)
4. They share natural sentiments. (Smith 1759)
5. When successful in improving their material state, they 
would proliferate and create a new state of scarcity, 
necessitating a new stage. (Smith 1966:335)
Smith based these stages on a rather selective reading of 
studies of the Indian tribes of the Hurons and Iroquoys in 
America (Marouby 2004:39). He was determined that during 
the first stage people had to be hunters, since he presumed 
that they wanted to eat meat. He belittled evidence in 
his sources that women were engaged in growing maize, 
saying that they planted only a few of these plants behind 
their huts. As hunting ceased to provide sufficiency for a 
growing population, people would domesticate animals and 
become pastoralists. But how could they find time to tame 
animals when already under stress to find food for their 
people (Marouby 2004:162)? And how could exchange and 
a division of labour take place in the absence of a surplus? 
Smith’s discussion of the hunters is highly ambivalent. On 
the one hand, they were unable to form capital as they had 
to spend all their time chasing animals. Yet, at the same time 
Smith argues that hunters could provide their necessities 
‘without great difficulty’ (1766:335).
Turning to the question why historically there has been 
‘a slow progress of opulence’, Smith (1766:521) mentions 
‘natural impediments’, such as just alluded to and ‘the 
oppression of civil government’ as possible reasons. Marouby 
asks in this regard: ‘But why should there be progress?’ 
Neither Smith nor his modern followers question the need 
for progress or economic growth. One worries rather about 
its absence or slowness (Marouby 2004:161). Importantly, 
in the various descriptions of how the stages develop and 
necessitate, Smith implicitly confuses the quantitative and 
the qualitative. He postulates not only a numerical growth 
of the population beyond available resources but also an 
improvement of production in quantitative terms. Even 
qualitative improvements generate desires or inclinations 
for more (Smith 1766:335–338). Marouby concludes that 
this is highly significant ‘not only for economic thought, but 
also for the history of ideas, because since Smith progress 
has always been conceived of in the manner of growth’ 
(Marouby 2004:88). According to Marouby (2004) Smith, in 
fact, transposed his anthropology into his economic theory:
In this transposition, the fundamental model of a universal 
progress of human societies, conceived as normative and 
natural, is translated into a temporal mode proper for economic 
life, which is also conceived as natural and normative, if not 
elevated to the supreme value, and from then on, the sovereign 
value of growth. (p. 30, author’s own translation)
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This desire for more is certainly a major element in present 
secularisation. 
Smith’s concept of philosophy
According to Vollenhoven (2000:1, 2) a thinker’s concept 
must be identified in terms of the time period and his or her 
view of ontology or the vertical structure of the cosmos.
Smith was a typical representative of the Enlightenment of 
the 18th century, a period during which Christianity had 
lost its formative cultural power as the ideal of quantitative 
technical and economic progress through science took hold 
(Venter 1992:321–323).
Smith’s ontology or view of the vertical structure of the 
cosmos, insofar as we can discern it from his epistemology, 
appears to be ennoetism or in-the-mind-ism. Tol (2010) notes 
that this type of philosophy is part of a theory of priority, 
meaning that there is one origin which diverges into a higher 
and a lower part. In ennoetism, according to Tol (2010), the 
nous or thinking or contemplating spirit is a higher principle, 
above that of psychic-somatic reality:
which is entirely self-dynamic and self-guided. The chief role of 
mind, as higher principle, is to contemplate this reality which, 
in doing so, makes it the content of its knowing and affects it 
through knowing it … Considered from the perspective of the 
human being, perception focuses on the psycho-somatic reality, 
while cognition characterizes the mind’s own contemplation. (p. 503) 
Such a divergence is apparent in Smith’s philosophy.
Origin 
Smith (1759) called God the Author of nature who as an artist 
or craftsman constructed the universe like a machine (pp. 19, 
105). According to Smith (1795) there is one origin of all, as he 
put it with reference to early humankind:
The idea of an universal mind, of a God of all, who originally 
formed the whole, and who governs the whole by general laws, 
directed to the conservation and prosperity of the whole, without 
regard to that of any private individual, was a notion to which 
they were utterly strangers. (p. 113) 
The allusion to a universal mind may well be an indication of 
a thinking mind as the higher part of the cosmos. The strong 
emphasis that Smith puts on the imagination, which includes 
reason, as the means whereby humans try to make sense of 
the universe is similar to the ‘thinking contemplating nous’ 
of the ennoetists. 
We should note Adam Smith’s admiration for Isaac Newton 
as the latter was also an ennoetist in Vollenhoven’s scheme 
(2005:287, 288). The great influence which Newton had on 
18th century thinking appears to have triggered ennoetism in 
at least 7 thinkers of the Enlightenment: Voltaire, Maupertuis, 
Buffon, d’Alembert, Lambert, Boscovich, Smith and Kant 
(Vollenhoven 2000:KG 44).
Primary divergence
If the thinking spirit is the higher part of the primary 
divergence of the origin, what is the lower part? Since 
movement cannot be imparted by a higher psyche, the 
psyche is built into the rest of the cosmos and therefore 
psychosomatic and self-moving. 
In each of his key works Smith begins with passions and 
psychological sentiments. Self-movement is emphasised not 
only in the history of astronomy (Smith 1795:38, 54, 55, 58), 
but also in the natural course of things in human history (the 
four stages). Humans, too, have a higher mind and a lower 
psychosomatic part, which is affected by the mind (Smith 
1759:27–31). 
The emphasis on the sentiments of wonder, surprise and 
admiration in the development of science means that the 
acquisition of knowledge is not a seeking of truth but rather a 
way of calming these sentiments (Biziou 2003:41–45). Reality 
is there because it is felt by these sentiments; whereafter the 
imagination constructs its systems or machines. 
Ennoetism has some additional features that can also be 
found in Smith, namely infinitism (Vollenhoven 2005:288) 
and aesthetics (Tol 2010:510). The division of labour will 
carry on as long as markets keep extending on the basis of 
an infinite process of capital accumulation. Aesthetics plays a 
role in the concept of being fit for utility (Smith 1759:IV). We 
admire technically sophisticated gadgets, even when they 
are not obviously useful, such as extremely accurate watches, 
and therefore take pleasure in making and having them, 
even when in the end they don’t help us: ‘It is this deception 
which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of 
mankind’ (Smith 1759:183). 
Smith’s impartial spectator appears to represent the 
contemplating human mind. As a rational figure, even 
a semi-god and a judge (Smith 1759:245) he exercises a 
permanent regulating influence in the moral society. There 
is also a stoic notion here in the sense of a god-within. Van 
Leeuwen argues that the impartial spectator represents 
Smith’s Christology. He is the abstract human, semi-mortal 
and semi-immortal, vested with divine authority, but also 
humankind’s representative; human as spectator, and 
divine as impartial ideal spectator (Van Leeuwen 1984:89). 
Obviously, this is a totally secularised Christology. 
Smith’s view on technology is also interesting. He wrote 
about the steam engine: ‘Such revolutionary processes are 
the work of contemplative minds’ (Buchan 2006:41). When 
such contemplation result in new technologies, they will 
have unintended consequences, but however profound 
these might be, they would impair neither the mechanism 
of economic activity, nor that of moral action, nor that of 
the material world as set forth by Newton. They are all sets 
of efficient causes and as such related to the one ultimate 
cause, a provident God. What we perceive as unintended 
consequences (the invisible hand) are in fact intended effects 
of divine action (Biziou 2003:264–266). Smith uses the latter 
as a rhetorical device, but not as an explanatory principle.
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The accumulation of capital and 
secularisation
Van Leeuwen has analysed Smith’s view on the accumulation 
of capital in Smith (1776:I, II). A commercial society can 
only keep growing if after each round of production part of 
the profit made is invested in further capital assets. This is 
an infinite process or an iron law of nature (Van Leeuwen 
1984:711). It involves ‘a hidden priority of capital over labour’. 
Capital ‘circulates automatically, like blood or water that 
returns as rain, as the stars by the universal force of gravity’ 
(Van Leeuwen 1984:723, 730, author’s own translation). 
According to this logic, all those who do not participate in 
expanding society’s capital, are unproductive, including the 
military and government officials (Smith 1776:II/3). Smith 
calls on the parables of the talents (Mt 25:14–30) and the 
prodigal son (Lk 15:11–32) to buttress his view. It costs time 
and money to develop talents, but once developed they may 
yield higher wages and may be passed on to one’s children 
via better education. The talent of the labourer is transformed 
into the capital stock of society (Van Leeuwen 1984:758). With 
regard to the parable of the two sons, Smith (1776) lauds the 
older son who faithfully works, but condemns the younger 
for dissipating his substance:
If the prodigality of some was not compensated by the frugality 
of others, the conduct of every prodigal, by feeding the idle with 
the bread of the industrious, tends not only to beggar himself, 
but to impoverish his country. (p. II, 3, 433)
Smith has secularised completely the great biblical message 
of the coming Kingdom. In his perspective we save ourselves 
solo labore [by work alone] and saving. By accumulating and 
investing capital we usher in everlasting prosperity. The tree 
of capital reaches to heaven (Van Leeuwen 1984:773–775). 
Conclusion 
As a deist, Adam Smith pursued his studies in the belief 
that the world is basically nature, left alone by God after the 
creation. Hence, in his main objective to become a Newton of 
human society, he looked for automatically working or self-
regulating systems rather than for God-given norms which 
responsible human beings should seek to obey. 
Society as a whole is a moral society in which passions and 
psychological sentiments are controlled by sympathy, a way 
in which we see ourselves as others may see us, a mirror 
image of loving others, including enemies, as ourselves. An 
ideal human or rational impartial spectator helps us do this 
in a reasonable manner. 
The commercial society is a subset of the moral one, in which 
humans are driven by the psychical sentiment of exchanging, 
buying and selling to maximise their self-interest by 
competing with each other in markets. Technology allows 
for a division of labour. Technical innovations allow for 
an ongoing extension of such a division. By saving and 
investing, the wealth of nations increases. It is a recipe for 
becoming rich. 
Both the moral and the commercial society are secularised 
concepts, distorted views of human beings and society. They 
have helped to make our society a materialistic one that puts 
its hope in technology, progress and quantitative economic 
growth. In this way Adam Smith may indeed be called a 
technicistic philosopher and as such a major contributor to 
the secularisation of Western culture.
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